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The post-death question in African metaphysics: Engaging Attoe on death and life’s meaning
Get PDFAribiah Attoe took issue with the materialist and the non-materialist African conceptions of death by arguing that the reality of death puts pressure on the human conception of life’s meaning. He admits the reality of an afterlife experience through a causal principle that sees events in the world as the product of interactions between predetermined past events. It is an afterlife where a decomposing body continues interacting with other things in the world, not an afterlife involving consciousness. While conscious meaning-making ends in the death of the body in Attoe’s materialist view, thereby affirming the conclusion that human existence is meaningless and the universe is purposeless, the conviction about life’s meaninglessness is also reinforced by the possibility of a second death, that is, the death of the transcendent consciousness in the traditional African view. In this article, I will mount two objections to Attoe’s submission. First, I argue that Attoe’s refutation of life’s meaning may be faulted by a world view devoid of the ideas of the afterlife and immortality. Life’s meaninglessness for him should have been limited to the facts of human existence in the world, not the human inability to continue meaning after death. Second, Attoe’s conception of death as finality questions his principle of causality that suggests the reality of an endless afterlife. Attoe’s overarching submission on life’s meaninglessness gives the impression that theories of life’s meaning must be anchored on the thought of an afterlife and immortality
Locating rights in the afro-communitarian scheme: Testing the compatibilist argument
Get PDFIn this paper, I explore the relationship between individual rights and duties within the Afro-communitarian discourse in African political philosophy. The notion of individual rights is prominent in modern African political philosophy, which is usually used to refer to the tension between community and individual in Afro-communitarianism. In this paper, I specifically focus on this question: Can Afro-communitarianism ground a plausible conception of individual rights that will be of benefit to modern African societies? I will discuss two approaches within the Afro-communitarian discourse that have offered a response to this question. On the one hand, are the duty-based incompatibilists who defend the primacy of duties over individual rights and claim that Afro-communitarianism is incompatible with individual rights. On the other hand, are the rights-based compatibilists who claim that Afro-communitarianism is compatible with individual rights by according to rights and duties equal status in African political philosophy. In this paper, I will take issues with the latter. First, I argue that rights-based compatibilists have not been able to locate individual rights in Afro-communitarianism beyond selective rights granted to a few persons by the community. Second, I argue that some rights-based compatibilists ground their theory of rights on an idea of community that is not communitarian. With these arguments, I establish that rights-based compatibilism does not dislodge the claims of duty-based incompatibilism
Moderate Communitarianism: A Conceptual Interpretation
No full textKwame Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism is considered a defence of individual rights and the equal worth of rights and duties in Afro-communitarianism. It concerns the primary status of rights and duties in modern African thought. However, moderate communitarianism has been received with strong reactions, one of which is the supposed serious consideration it gives to duties and community in the final analysis of its argument regarding the conception of personhood and the relationship between the self and its community. Criticism of moderate communitarianism is about its inability to capture the rights of individuals that is bold in its demand for primary status in the Afro-communitarian political thought dominated by the supremacy of communal duties—a stance that triggered its emergence. Nonetheless, I argue that a reading of moderate communitarianism demonstrates that its criticism is mainly due to some unclarity in Gyekye’s analysis and that, contrary to existing defence, moderate communitarianism, as an account of moderate persons and moderate communities, is not a description of what exists in Afro-communitarianism but a designed framework for modern Afro-communitarianism in a way that redefines the communitarian nature of African thought. Interpreting moderate communitarianism as suggesting a direction for Afro-communitarianism would be essential for a meaningful engagement with it
Mbiti on Community in African Political Thought: Reconciling the "I" and the "We"
Get PDFIn this article, I draw attention to the value of community in John Mbiti’s philosophy using his famous axiom by reconciling the tension between the individual and community his philosophy envisages. To do this, I offer a reconstruction of Mbiti’s communitarian axiom: “I am because we are; and since we are, therefore I am.” Mbiti is considered one of the forerunners of the communitarian debate in African philosophy. His axiom, which describes his idea of Afro-communitarianism, accounts for the importance of individual and community in thinking about social existence in African thought. However, Mbiti’s argument for the direct influence of the community in the formation of the individual is taken to mean the supremacy of the community over the individual. Mbiti’s concept of community has implications for the idea of personhood in that it raises the question of individual agency. This has affected the reception of Mbiti’s contribution to the idea of community in African political thought. While Mbiti’s contributions to Afro-communitarianism transcend the discourse of personhood, I argue that maximising the potential of his idea requires reconstruction and a critical analysis of his axiom. In doing that, I demonstrate that a possible relationship exists between the “I” and “we” in his axiom that represents a harmony between the community and individual and does not suggest a primacy of either but the significance of community. This analysis will enable fair engagement with Mbiti’s conception of community
The post-death question in African metaphysics: Engaging Attoe on death and life’s meaning
No full textAribiah Attoe took issue with the materialist and the non-materialist African conceptions of death by arguing that the reality of death puts pressure on the human conception of life’s meaning. He admits the reality of an afterlife experience through a causal principle that sees events in the world as the product of interactions between predetermined past events. It is an afterlife where a decomposing body continues interacting with other things in the world, not an afterlife involving consciousness. While conscious meaning-making ends in the death of the body in Attoe’s materialist view, thereby affirming the conclusion that human existence is meaningless and the universe is purposeless, the conviction about life’s meaninglessness is also reinforced by the possibility of a second death, that is, the death of the transcendent consciousness in the traditional African view. In this article, I will mount two objections to Attoe’s submission. First, I argue that Attoe’s refutation of life’s meaning may be faulted by a world view devoid of the ideas of the afterlife and immortality. Life’s meaninglessness for him should have been limited to the facts of human existence in the world, not the human inability to continue meaning after death. Second, Attoe’s conception of death as finality questions his principle of causality that suggests the reality of an endless afterlife. Attoe’s overarching submission on life’s meaninglessness gives the impression that theories of life’s meaning must be anchored on the thought of an afterlife and immortality
African epistemologies and the decolonial curriculum
Get PDFIn this article we argue that a discussion on African epistemologies must precede the quest for both the decolonisation of knowledge and curriculum in Africa. Decolonial thought in Africa is significant because it focuses, among other things, on the decolonisation of Western epistemological supremacy within the space where knowledge is produced and transferred. We contend that knowledge acquired through the process of learning must resonate with people’s lived experiences and realities. To meaningfully pursue that involves placing in focus people’s modes of thought and epistemic ideas, in the interpretation of their experiences and the realities around them. This article argues that designing a decolonised curriculum that centres unique African intellectual ideas should be informed by the understanding of African epistemologies, whose principle of epistemic validation is grounded on the idea of interconnectedness in African thought. Considering a decolonial curriculum as an attempt in pursuing ‘centring’ is to align curricula with the modes of knowledge validation in African thought
Grounding African political theory on afro-communitarianism: arguments and implications=Ukuqeqeshelwa injulalwazi yezombusazwe yase-Africa i-African Political Theory phezu kwenzululwazi yokuxhumuna komuntu ongumAfrika nomphakathi i-Afro-Communitarianism: Imibonomcabango Nemithelela.
No full textDoctoral Degree. University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban.This thesis critically analyses Afro-communitarianism as a philosophical foundation for modern African political theories and practices. The thesis links the reception of Afro-communitarian political philosophy in modern African political philosophy with its long-standing tension between community and individual as well as the conflict between rights and duty in modern African political philosophy. The attempt to resolve this tension in literature has mainly focused on the ideas of personhood. The thesis shows how development of the personhood approach to resolving this tension was manifested in three senses, i.e. duty-based, rights-based, and Afro-communitarian rejectionism. These three senses are both interrelated and independent discourses in African political philosophy. The duty-based personhood approach holds that personhood is defined solely by the structure of the community and not the self. It contends a notion of the self whose definition of meaningful life is generated outside the reference to community dependency. According to this approach, an ideal individual is a communal conformist, one that prioritises the duty to the community over the self. As a result, this approach defends a political society where concerns of rights, especially individual rights, do not matter. Following this approach is the rights-based personhood response. The rights-based approach responds to the lacunae in the duty-based personhood approach. Rights-based personhood approach is also an independent position at resolving the tension in Afro-communitarian political thought. This approach seeks to defend the compatibility of rights with Afro-communitarianism and its equal status with communal obligation. It argues for certain features of humans that suggest the partial dependency of the self on the community in the definition of human personhood. Grounding on these features, the approach established the place of rights, autonomy, and freedom in the Afro-communitarian discourse. However, what stands clear in this account of personhood is the persistence of the community and its overwhelming nature in framing the functions of the political virtues of rights, autonomy, and freedom believed to be individual properties. Rights only matter to the extent of their coherence with communal values. It becomes apparent that the idea of individual rights remains vague, especially in the face of specific human expression in communitarian African societies. The conflicts between individual and community and rights and duty in the idea of personhood in Afro-communitarian thought stirred up the third response and the third sense of the personhood approach, which I refer to as Afro-communitarian rejectionism. Scholars in this camp suggest the need to have a conversation on modern African politics without Afro-communitarian ideas. This position rests on the claim that modern African philosophy will be influenced by diverse orientations, which are sometimes incompatible with the ideas of Afro-communitarianism. However, the challenge with this conception of personhood is that it ruled out the possibility of a developed modern Africa profiting from the merits of Afro-communitarianism. While the tension between the individual and community persists, the thesis argues that attention should be given to the analysis of the community. In analysing the idea of community, the thesis identified the various forms of community that undergird the various ideas of personhood in Afrocommunitarianism, namely cultural community and community as self-interested individuals. The first form of community is the Afro-communitarian notion of community. I show how the idea of humiliation is inherent in the ideal notion of community in Afro-communitarianism and the conception of self it informs. The question of humiliation is omitted in the various conceptions of personhood. For Afro-communitarianism to ground modern African political ideas and practices, its notion of the community must be non-humiliating. Achieving a non-humiliating community involves a review of the norms of the cultural community. I attempt this review with what I call the doctrine of cultural permissibility. This thesis redirects Afro-communitarian debates by arguing for a shift to the community. The thesis concludes that postcolonial African politics can only benefit from Afro-communitarianism preoccupied with the desire for a ‘non-humiliating’ community that accommodates plural conceptions of personhood. This thesis would provide nuanced views on the ongoing conversation among Afro-communitarian theorists.
Iqoqa
Lolu cwaningo luhlaziya ngokunzulu inzululwazi yokuxhumuna komuntu ongumAfrika i-Afro-communitarianism njengenzululwazi eyisisekelo sezinjulalwazi zezombusazwe nokwenziwayo kobu-Afrika. Ucwaningo luxhumanisa ukwamukeleka kwenzululwazi yezombusazwe i-Afro-communitarian yenzululwazi yobu-Afrika yesimanje nodweshu oseluhambe ibanga elide phakathi komuntu ngamunye nomphakathi kanjalo nodweshu oluphakathi kwamalungelo nokwenziwa komsebenzi enzululwazini yezombusazwe yase-Afrika. Umzamo wokuxazulula lokhu kungqubuzana emibhalweni sekugxile kakhulu kokomuntu. Ucwaningo lukhombisa ukuthi kwenziwe kanjani ukuthuthukiswa kwendlela yokomuntu ukuxazulula ukungqubuzana ngezindlela ezintathu okuyilezi; okugxile emsebenzini, okugxile emalungelweni, nomcabango wokwenqaba ngokwe-Afro-communitarian. Indlela yokomuntu okugxile emsebenzini yencike ekuthini okomuntu kungachazwa kuphela ngesakhiwo somphakathi kodwa hhayi ngokomuntu nje. Ngokwale ndlela, umuntu okahle yilowo ohambisana nokomphakathi, lowo oqhuba phambili imisebenzi yomphakathi kunalokho okungokwakhe. Ukulandela le ndlela yindlela ephendula okomuntu, okuyindlela evikela ukuhambisana nezinga elilinganayo ngokwamalungelo nemisebenzi. Nokho-ke, okuzimele obala kulo mbiko ngokomuntu yimbelesi yomphakathi nemvelaphi yawo ngokubanzi ezungeze imisebenzi yamalungelo, ukuzimela nenkululeko. Umqondo wesithathu wendlela yokomuntu yileyo engiyibiza ngokwala kwe- Afro-communitarian. Ongoti baleli qoqo baphakamisa isidingo sokuba nengxoxo ngezombusazwe zobu-Afrika zesimanje ngaphandle kwemibono ye-Afro-communitarian. Isimo sencike ekuqakuleni ukuthi inzululwazi yobu-Afrika yesimanje itheleleka yizimfundiso ezahlukene, kwenye inkathi ezingahambisani nemibono ye-Afro-communitarianism. Ngenkathi kuqhubeka ukungqubuzana phakathi komuntu nomphakathi, ucwaningo luqakula ukuthi kufanele kuqashelwe ukuhlaziywa komphakathi ngokukhomba izinhlobo ezahlukene zomphakhathi eziqukethe imibono eyahlukene yokobuntu kwe-Afro-communitarian. Ngikhombisa ukuthi umbono wokujivazeka ungena kanjani embonweni womphakathi, wesiko nasekwakhekeni ukwazisa okokomuntu. Umbuzo ongokujivazeka uyeqiwa ekwakheni okwahlukahlukene kokomuntu. Ukwenzela ukuthi i- Afro-communitarianism yeseke imibono yezombusazwe yase-Afrika yesimanje, umongo wayo womphakathi kufanele ungajivazi. Ukuzuza umphakathi ongajivazi kufaka ukubuyekezwa kwezinjwayezi zomphakathi nangokwesiko. Ngizama lokhu kubuyekeza ngalokho engikubiza ngokuthi yimfundiso yokuvumeleka ngokwesiko. Ucwaningo luphetha ngokuthi ezombusazwe zasemva kobukoloni zingazuza ngokwe-Afro-communitarianism egxile ekulangazeleleni emphakathini ongajivazi futhi owamukela imibono eyahlukene yokomuntu
Mbiti on Community in African Political Thought: Reconciling the “I” and the “We”
No full textIn this article, I draw attention to the value of community in John Mbiti’s philosophy using his famous axiom by reconciling the tension between the individual and community his philosophy envisages. To do this, I offer a reconstruction of Mbiti’s communitarian axiom: “I am because we are; and since we are, therefore I am.” Mbiti is considered one of the forerunners of the communitarian debate in African philosophy. His axiom, which describes his idea of Afro-communitarianism, accounts for the importance of individual and community in thinking about social existence in African thought. However, Mbiti’s argument for the direct influence of the community in the formation of the individual is taken to mean the supremacy of the community over the individual. Mbiti’s concept of community has implications for the idea of personhood in that it raises the question of individual agency. This has affected the reception of Mbiti’s contribution to the idea of community in African political thought. While Mbiti’s contributions to Afro-communitarianism transcend the discourse of personhood, I argue that maximising the potential of his idea requires reconstruction and a critical analysis of his axiom. In doing that, I demonstrate that a possible relationship exists between the “I” and “we” in his axiom that represents a harmony between the community and individual and does not suggest a primacy of either but the significance of community. This analysis will enable fair engagement with Mbiti’s conception of community
Second-wave AI and Afro-existential norms
No full textThe idea of afro-existentialism connotes how Africans make sense of living and the meaning and meaninglessness attached to human existence. Different phenomena inform the way humans interpret existence, and one of such in the contemporary period, with great influence on Africans, is human involvement with non-human intelligence (AI), in its different eruptions. This paper focuses on the second-wave AI, which is a period of improved simulation of natural intelligence, whose singularity principle hypothesizes individualist motives. The paper asks, to what extent do Afroexistential norms accommodate second-wave AI? Partly in disagreement with the claim that AI is for everyone, we argue that second-wave artificial intelligence weakly adapts to Afro-existential practices, which is largely communal, emphasizing shared experience. We justify this claim by arguing that Western ethical patterns, which inform the features of the second-wave AI such as statistical patterns, smart algorithm, specialized hardware, and big data sets, emerge from individualist notions. This paper argues that second-wave AI trends do not reflect African norms of existence being factored into ordering algorithmic patterns that set up AI systems and programs. We infer that Afro-existential practices unsettles with the individualist principle which underlines second-wave AI and therefore, a conversation around the development and application of communal interpretation of AI is important
African epistemologies and the decolonial curriculum
Get PDFIn this article we argue that a discussion on African epistemologies must precede the quest for both the decolonisation of knowledge and curriculum in Africa. Decolonial thought in Africa is significant because it focuses, among other things, on the decolonisation of Western epistemological supremacy within the space where knowledge is produced and transferred. We contend that knowledge acquired through the process of learning must resonate with people’s lived experiences and realities. To meaningfully pursue that involves placing in focus people’s modes of thought and epistemic ideas, in the interpretation of their experiences and the realities around them. This article argues that designing a decolonised curriculum that centres unique African intellectual ideas should be informed by the understanding of African epistemologies, whose principle of epistemic validation is grounded on the idea of interconnectedness in African thought. Considering a decolonial curriculum as an attempt in pursuing ‘centring’ is to align curricula with the modes of knowledge validation in African thought.
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