222 research outputs found

    HISTORY, ORGANIZATION AND STRATEGIES FOR GRAIN PRODUCERS AND THE GRAIN INDUSTRY IN MICHIGAN

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    The grain system (grain producers and the grain industry) in Michigan finds itself in a transition period. Production (yield) and price limitations along with escalating cost factors have left producers in a situation where, without government assistance, many more would have to exit the farm. The grain industry (in this study, the industry refers to the grain handlers and processors), while in a stronger financial situation than producers, would suffer negatively if volume of grains bought and sold through their facilities decreased, and more in the industry would have to exit. A transition is needed to increase profitability of grain producers and the grain handlers and processors in Michigan. Without a transition, the trend of decreasing farms and acres will continue, to the detriment of the Michigan grain system. But how does the system make a transition, and what kind of transition is needed? This study strives to find the strategies, through understanding the history and organization of the system, that will provide direction. This study uses two analytical approaches to understand the grain system from the producer level and the industry level. By comparing the Industrial Organization approach and the Strategic Management approach, a clearer understanding of the problems should be ascertained. That understanding, with a background of the history of the grain system development in Michigan allows a thorough discussion of the possible solutions that can help both producers and grain handlers and processors be more profitable and continue to be an important economic factor in the state. The findings of the study indicate that there are several partial solutions to the problems, depending on the region of the state, the attitude of producers and companies within the industry, and the markets themselves. The situation can be improved by differentiating, coordinating, cooperating and adjusting processes in those areas that can successfully be addressed and changed by individual producers and each firm. Further research could overcome constraints of this study to find alternative and successful adaptations for the system.Crop Production/Industries,

    THE ECONOMICS OF GRAIN PRODUCER CARTELS

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    The objective of this study is to measure economic payoffs from a grain cartel. Two basic approaches to extract economic rents are considered: (i) Mandatory supply controls to restrict production and raise grain price, and (2) export price discrimination using export taxes or subsidies. The economic impacts of different producer cartel scenarios were estimated using a long-term, nine-region world trade simulation model incorporating the assumptions of neoclassical trade theory. The SWOPSIM program was used to write the model equations. Economic Research Service trade data for 1989 were used to initialize the model. Results reflect long-run changes from 1989conditions and are at 1989 general price levels. The model simultaneously estimated outcomes in markets for nine commodities: beef, pork, poultry meat, wheat, corn, coarse grains (other than corn), oilseeds (soybeans, rapeseed, and sunflower seed), oilmeal, and sugar. Cross-effects among commodities and input-output relationships between field crop and livestock production are accounted for by substitution and complementary coefficients in behavioral equations. Countries and groups of countries included in the model are Australia, Canada, the European Community (EC), European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the United States (US), Japan, and the rest of the world (ROW). The simulation results report the consequences of restricting only US grain production (wheat, corn, and other coarse grains) from 5 to 20% below the 1989 production level. Grain supply restrictions were presumed to be mandatory, hence taxpayers incurred no additional outlays over those in 1989 . World price increases were modest for wheat, but greater for corn and other coarse grains in part because of differences in market share among grains. US consumers of grain and grain products buy less at higher prices and are worse off, as is the country as a whole. Consumer surplus falls nearly 2billionwhengrainsupplyisreduced202 billion when grain supply is reduced 20 %. Higher grain prices and lower costs more than compensate producers for less output, despite lower receipts attending an elastic demand. According to simulation results, cartel-like action restricting US supplies by 15% would most benefit American grain producers. Consumers in the US and the world lose more than producers gain from cartel action restricting production and lowering US exports of grain. Other competing exporters enjoy net benefits from higher world prices. However, because the rest of the world is a net consumer, net economic welfare of other countries is reduced. Also, overall world income is reduced by a cartel. As additional global production comes under the control of the cartel, more producer surplus can be extracted from consumers. Results were simulated for grain producers in four developed countries or regions (Australia, Canada, EC, and US) forming a cartel and simultaneously restricting production from 5 to 20%. As expected, world prices rise more with the comprehensive grain cartel than with the US acting alone. The more comprehensive international cartel helps producers extract greater rents from consumers. It is notable that none of the supply restriction schemes would benefit the US as a nation. Rest-of-the-world and total world welfare losses mount when supply restrictions are tightened from 5 to 20% of market output. When the US alone tightly restricts grain production, it loses more than ROW. When the US, Canada, Australia, and the EC jointly restrict production, ROW incurs greater welfare losses than the US. Turning next to support subsidies without supply controls, we estimated that net benefits to producers are greatest with export subsidies, expanding exports by 30% and with an attendant increase in domestic prices. The cartel can subsidize exports with collections from producers, leaving its members with some net gain. Results are even more favorable for producers if taxpayers pay the export subsidy as under the current Export Enhancement Program (EEP). However, because national welfare is reduced, a government truly representative of the nation's economic welfare would not rationally choose to subsidize exports. Overall US welfare is modestly increased when domestic price is lowered with an export tariff and exports decline. In contrast, the rest of the world as a net importer benefits from plans increasing US exports and lowering the world price of grains. But, any form of market distortion lowers overall global welfare. Total numbers are smaller but patterns are similar when only US com producers attempt the optimal subsidy or tariff strategy. A US com-only producer cartel would choose an export subsidy because the producers' benefits are positive even if they pay the export subsidy. Outcomes were simulated in which percentage increases in US exports were matched by equal percentage increases in exports of other major competitors (Canada, the European Community, and Australia). Retaliation causes the average cost of subsidizing US exports to nearly double to achieve any given percentage increase in exports. Retaliation by competing exporters removes much of the attractiveness of US export subsidies. If producers pay for export subsidies, their net gains are sharply eroded with retaliation. Welfare losses to the US as a nation and to the world enlarge with retaliation to subsidies. Thus the US and the world have a stake in successful multilateral negotiation reducing subsidies and attendant retaliation. It is conceivable that an effort by producers to form a cartel would so alienate the public that Congress would terminate current commodity programs, including export assistance on grain. Net benefits to producers from cartel activity never approached the 7 billion in rents they collect from current programs. It seems unlikely that a producer group would risk gains of this size for the prospect of cartel rents a sixth the size or less from international markets. Gains to US producers are less for a wheat cartel than for either the feed grain cartel or for the wheat-feed grain cartel included herein. The unfavorable outcomes originate from the export demand for US wheat made highly elastic by opportunities to substitute feed grain for wheat in production and consumption especially in the long run. That is, a high wheat price and controlled production of wheat encourages importers to produce wheat, cut back feed grain production, and import low-cost feed grains.Crop Production/Industries, International Relations/Trade,

    The Evolution of Grain Policy Beyond Europe: Ottoman Grain Administration in the Late Eighteenth Century

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    During the second half of the eighteenth century, the Ottoman policy-makers adopted a more liberal attitude towards price formation in the Ottoman grain markets. This was accompanied by the fiscal and administrative centralization of the grain trade. These seemingly contradictory policy changes could, in part, be explained in the context of conjectural changes in grain demand and supply, which rendered pre-emptive privileges and price controls less effective. The policy change, however, was not only a practical response to the strains on the pre-existing supply network but also reflected a new concern with the state of agricultural production along with the emergence of emulation as a development strategy.Ottoman economic institutions, grain markets, liberalization

    THE USE OF MEAN-VARIANCE FOR COMMODITY FUTURES AND OPTIONS HEDGING DECISIONS

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    This study provides additional evidence of the usefulness of mean-variance procedures in the presence of options which can truncate and skew the returns distribution. Using a simulation analysis, price hedging decisions are examined for hog producers when options are available. Mean-variance results are contrasted with optimal decisions based on negative exponential and Cox-Rubinstein utility functions over 56 ending price scenarios and two levels of risk aversion. The findings from our simulation, which considers discrete contracts, basis risk, lognormality in prices, transactions costs, and alternative utility specifications, affirm the usefulness of mean-variance framework.Marketing,

    Inertia emulation control of VSC-HVDC transmission system

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    The increasing penetration of power electronics interfaced renewable generation (e.g. offshore wind) has been leading to a reduction in conventional synchronous-machine based generation. Most converter-interfaced energy sources do not contribute to the overall power system inertia; and therefore cannot support the system during system transients and disturbances. It is therefore desirable that voltage-source-converter (VSC) based high voltage direct current (HVDC) interfaces, which play an important role in delivery of renewable power to AC systems, could contribute a virtual inertia and provide AC grid frequency support. In this paper, an inertia emulation control (IEC) system is proposed that allows VSC-HVDC system to perform an inertial response in a similar fashion to synchronous machines (SM), by exercising the electro-static energy stored in DC shunt capacitors of the HVDC system. The proposed IEC scheme has been implemented in simulations and its performance is evaluated using Matlab/Simulink

    THE ECONOMICS OF CLEANING WINTER WHEAT FOR EXPORT: AN EVALUATION OF PROPOSED FEDERAL "CLEAN GRAIN" STANDARDS

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    Buyer complaints about poor quality U.S. wheat have led to proposals to enforce minimum dockage standards for exports. An economic-engineering approach is used to evaluate costs and benefits of cleaning wheat in order to meet these standards for 13 possible cleaning configurations. These results are used in an optimization framework to estimate costs and benefits of cleaning all U.S. export wheat. The estimates indicate that cleaning U.S. export winter wheat to .35% dockage would cost an average of 1 cent/bu., requiring an initial capital investment of $28 million. Value of wheat lost in cleaning is a significant cost that previously has been overlooked.Agricultural and Food Policy,

    Transient fault analysis of a VSC-based multi-terminal HVDC scheme

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    Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Engineering: Electrical Engineering, Durban University of Technology, Durban, South Africa, 2020.A multiterminal HVDC system includes the connection of different HVDC terminals to a common grid. Most of the MTDC networks are realized in voltage source converter (VSC) high voltage direct current (HVDC). Over long distances, HVDC transmission is preferred to high voltage direct current (HVAC). Furthermore, HVDC is subjected to minimal harmonics oscillation problems due to the absence of frequency. HVDC enables the interconnection of systems at different frequencies, and the system becomes free of angular stability problems. VSCs employ insulated gate bipolar transistors (IGBTs) switches, and High-frequency pulse width modulation is used to operate the IGBTs in order to achieve high-speed control of active and reactive power. The growth of MTDC networks may require a new type of VSCs topology, which is resilient and efficient to dc and ac network fault. This research investigation focuses on the transient dc-side fault analysis in a two-level Monopolar VSC- Based Multi-Terminal HVDC Scheme consisting of four asynchronous terminals sharing a rated 400kV DC-grid was carried out in PSCAD software. During dc-side fault analysis, a pole-to-ground fault was taken into consideration as it’s more likely to occur, although it is less severe compared to pole-to-pole. The converters are interconnected through 100 km dc cables placed 0.5 gm apart and at a depth of 1.5 m underground. It was observed that during the steady-state analysis, the dc voltage in the grid was maintained at the rated value 400 kV, the currents measured at the converters bus was 0.5 kA, and the current flowing through the cables was 0.25 kA. Under the fault condition, the dc voltage drop needs to be maintained to a closed range to avoid the grid to collapse. The voltage droop technique was incorporated in the dc voltage controller to keep the dc voltage at the narrow range. Depending on the value and nature of ground fault resistance, the fault current magnitude varies, and distance variation along the cable has a significant contribution in the fault current. It is observed that fault close to the converter (5 km’s measured 9 kA) results in high fault currents compared to fault away from the converter (50 km’s measured 7.8 kA). The protection design of the VSC needs to be able to detect whether its ground fault or short circuit since the location of the fault needs to be identified and repaired. Another observation made when the fault is inserted 50 kms away from the converter, meaning the fault is at the center of the two converters, the outcome results in high currents in both converters. The isolation of the fault should be fast and selective as the critical time is very short. The dc circuit breakers are mostly recommended to be used as primary protection; however, different protection techniques need to be incorporated with dc circuit breaker in order to quickly identify, select and reliable isolate the faulted line. Moreover, the protection should be able to isolate the line before the fault reaches the maximum fault current to avoid the damage in the converter components.

    Optimal dynamic marketing strategies for grain producers: A case study of winter wheat

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    The purpose of this research is to determine and examine optimal grain marketing decisions utilizing a stochastic dynamic programming framework. Consideration is given to the linkages, stochastic nature, and dynamics of income taxes, current grain market conditions, the financial condition of the firm, marketing constraints of the producer and government programs. The stochastic dynamic programming model's objective function is to maximize the expected value of after-tax wealth. State variables considered in the analysis are (1) cash grain price, (2) basis level (futures minus cash), (3) before-tax income level, (4) grain storage level, (5) futures position, and (6) value associated with any futures position. The quantity of cash grain sales and futures transactions to occur each month are the decision variables considered in this analysis.Analyzing optimal grain marketing decisions for a dry-land Montana winter wheat producer indicate that optimal hedging levels increase as the basis level and before-tax income level of the firm increases. Conversely, optimal cash grain sale levels increase as the basis and before-tax income level of the firm decreases. The incentive for cash grain sales increases (decreases) as the end of the tax year approaches for low (high) before-tax income levels, due to the progressive marginal tax structure.Sensitivity of optimal grain marketing decisions to changes in actual production and production cost is analyzed. Results indicate that optimal hedging levels decline when actual production is less than that anticipated, and increased production cost levels increase cash grain sales and decrease hedging levels. Although changes in these parameters produce somewhat different results, they are relatively less important than the level of cash price, basis, before-tax income, and grain storage level in determining optimal grain marketing decisions.Optimal grain marketing decisions from the stochastic dynamic programming model are compared to a traditional minimum variance hedging ratio framework. The stochastic dynamic programming framework accumulated the most profits for the firm and also produced the lowest variability in annual after-tax income.Made available in DSpace on 2011-05-07T13:00:30Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4922 bytes, checksum: 910b249b4beec47e7ab768910c8f966f (MD5) 8924960.pdf: 6626865 bytes, checksum: b20c37e3554d07fc1ae0f880fee1aece (MD5) Previous issue date: 1989Item marked as restricted to the 'UIUC Users [automated]' Group (id=2) by Howard Ding ([email protected]) on 2011-05-07T14:48:58Z Item is restricted indefinitely.Restriction data tranferred 2014-07-01T11:22:14-05:00 Original Data Group with Access UIUC Users [automated] Release Date: none Reason: ETDs are only available to UIUC Users without author permissionETDs are only available to UIUC Users without author permissionU of I Onl

    Quasi two-level operation of a five-level diode clamped converter

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