1,463 research outputs found
Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets
No full textWe study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many to-many matching markets. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the worker-optimal stable mechanism is a stable and group strategy-proof rule for firms and workers. Furthermore, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-to-many matching markets.Both authors acknowledge financial support from Ministerio Economía y Competitividad
(Spain) under project ECO2014 57442 P and from Fondecyt under project No. 1151230. Romero-Medina acknowledges the financial support from
Ministerio Economía y Competitividad (Spain) MDM 2014-0431, and Comunidad
de Madrid, MadEco-CM (S2015/HUM-3444) and Triossi acknowledges
the financial support from the Institute for Research in Market Imperfections
and Public Policy, ICM IS130002, Ministerio de Economía, Fomento y Turismo.
Triossi acknowledges the hospitality of Collegio Carlo Alberto while writing this
paper
Group strategy-proof stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation under multi-unit demand: a note
No full textIn this note we prove that group strategy-proofness and strategyproofness are equivalent
requirements on stable mechanisms in prioritybased resource allocation problems with
multi-unit demand.Both authors acknowledge financial support
from MEC under project ECO2014 57442 P and from Fondecyt under project No. 1151230. Romero-Medina acknowledges the financial support from the Ministerio Economía y Competitividad (Spain),
grants, MECD PR15/00306 and MDM 2014-0431. Triossi acknowledges the financial support from the
Institute for Research in Market Imperfections and Public Policy, ICM IS130002, Ministerio de Economía, Fomento y Turismo
Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets
No full textWe study a class of sequential non-revelation mechanisms through which hospitals make simultaneous
take-it-or-leave-it offers to doctors. The inclusion of contracts shrinks the set of equilibrium outcomes
and harms doctors more than hospitals, but it maintains the stability of the set of equilibrium outcomes.
Our analysis reveals the existence of a first-mover advantage that is absent from the model without
contracts. The mechanisms of this class are outcome equivalent and implement the set of stable
allocations in subgame perfect equilibrium when enough competitive pressure is present. Equilibrium
outcomes form a lattice when preferences are substitutable.Both authors acknowledge financial support received from Ministerio Economía y Competitividad (Spain) under project
ECO2014_57442_P and from Fondecyt under project No. 1151230. Romero-Medina acknowledges financial support received
from Ministerio Economía y Competitividad (Spain) PR15/00306 and MDM 2014-0431, and Comunidad de Madrid, MadEco-CM
(S2015/HUM-3444), and Triossi acknowledges financial support received from the Institute for Research in Market Imperfections
and Public Policy, ICM IS130002, Ministerio de Economía, Fomento y Turismo [Chile]. We thank Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, José Alcalde,
Luis Corchón, Umut Dur, Lars Ehlers, Hideo Konishi, Thayer Morrill, Alejandro Neme, Jorge Oviedo, Tayfun Sönmez, Bertan
Turhan, Utkun Ünver, and Yosuke Yasuda for their helpful comments. Triossi acknowledges the hospitality of Collegio Carlo
Alberto, and Romero-Medina acknowledges the hospitality of Boston College afforded while writing this paper
Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?
No full textThis paper presents a strategic model of common value elections with endogenous information acquisition. It proves that majoritarian elections can fail to aggregate information when voters have heterogeneous skills and provides necessary and sufficient conditions for information aggregation. Inefficiencies can be partially corrected by limiting participation to the most competent citizens, a result which provides a rational foundation for epistocratic government
Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets
No full textIn this study we present a simple mechanism in a many-to-one matching market where multiple costless applications are allowed. The mechanism is based on the principles of eligibility and priority and it implements the set of stable matchings in Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. We extend the analysis to a symmetric mechanism where colleges and students interchange their roles. This mechanism also implements the set of stable matchings
Reliability and Responsibility: a Theory of Endogenous Commitment
No full textA common assumption in Political Science literature is policy commitment: candidates maintain their electoral promises. We study its validity and we prove that is an costless electoral is an effective way of transmitting information to voters. We investigate the responsiveness of policies to electoral promises depending on politicians' motivations. The results are robust to relevant equilibrium refinements
Strategy-proof and group strategy-proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence
No full textWe prove that group strategy-proofness and strategy-proofness are equivalent requirements on stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation problems with multi-unit demand. The result extends to the model with contracts
A horizontally scalable online processing system for trigger-less data acquisition
No full textThe vast majority of high energy physics experiments rely on data acquisition and hardware-based trigger systems performing a number of stringent selections before storing data for offline analysis. The online reconstruction and selection performed at the trigger level are bound to the synchronous nature of the data acquisition system, resulting in a trade-off between the amount of data collected and the complexity of the online reconstruction performed. Exotic physics processes, such as long-lived and slow-moving particles, are rarely targeted by online triggers as they require complex and nonstandard online reconstruction, usually incompatible with the time constraints of most data acquisition systems. The online trigger selection can thus impact as one of the main limiting factors to the experimental reach for exotic signatures. Alternative data acquisition solutions based on the continuous and asynchronous processing of the stream of data from the detectors are therefore foreseeable as a way to extend the experimental physics reach. Trigger-less data readout systems, paired with efficient streaming data processing solutions, can provide a viable alternative. In this document, an end-to-end implementation of a fully trigger-less data acquisition and online data processing system is discussed. An easily scalable and deployable implementation of such an architecture is proposed, based on open-source distributed computing frameworks capable of performing asynchronous online processing of streaming data. The proposed schema can be suitable for deployment as a fully integrated data acquisition system for small-scale experimental apparatus, or to complement the trigger-based data acquisition systems of larger experiments. A muon telescope setup consisting of a set of gaseous detectors is used as the experimental development testbed in this work, and a fully integrated online processing pipeline deployed on cloud computing resources is implemented and described
Boosting scientific research : evidence from a public program
No full textWe analyze the design of a unique Spanish public program aimed at recruiting high quality researchers in public research centers: the Ramón y Cajal Program. We claim that, after a number of calls, the program design changed in response to agents' needs. Exploiting data on applications and candidates we find that the new program design led to significant changes in the probability of being awarded with a contract. In particular, opportunities for candidates without attachment to the system were equalized.We thank the Subdirección General de Formación y Movilidad del Personal Investigador (Spanish Office of Training and Mobility of
Researchers) for providing the raw data, and Miguel Benavente for help in data handling. Research funding from Ministry of Education,
Grant Nos. ECO2009-11165 (Alonso-Borrego), ECO2011-25330 (Romero-Medina and Triossi) and ECO2009-10287 (Sánchez-Mangas) is
acknowledged
Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability
No full textThis note considers a hiring mechanism with multiple applications and application costs, which encompasses the common features of many real-world procedures. Multiple applications impose serious coordination problems to colleges, but application costs restore stability. With zero application costs unstable allocations arise at equilibrium. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions that guarantee the stability of the outcomes. © 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved
- …
