9,497 research outputs found
On Preference, Freedom and Diversity
No full textThe original publication is available at www.springerlink.comWe study the problem of ranking sets of options in terms of freedom of
choice.We propose a framework in which both the diversity of the options and the
preferences of the agent over the options do play a role.We formulate some axioms
that reflect these two aspects of freedom and we study their logical implications.
Two different criteria for ranking sets are characterized, which generalize some of
the rankings proposed so far in the literature.Vito Peragine acknowledges financial support from
BEC-2001-1653 and the MIUR, Italy (research project on “The Analysis and Measurement of
Freedom”). Romero-Medina acknowledges financial support fromMEC SEJ 2005-06167/ECON
and Comunidad de Madrid project 06/HSE/0174/2004.Publicad
Stability in one-sided matching markets
No full textThe stable roommates problem may be unsolvable for sorne instances, therefore we study a relaxation, when it is allowed to form groups of any size (the stable partition problem). Two extensions of preferences over individuals to preferences over sets are suggested. For the first one, derived from the most prefered member of a set, it is shown that a stable partition always existis if the original preferences are strict and a simple algorithm for its computation is derived. This algorithm turns out to be strategy proof. The second extension, based on the least prefered member of a set, produces solutions very similar to those for the stable roornmates problem
Group strategy-proof stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation under multi-unit demand: a note
No full textIn this note we prove that group strategy-proofness and strategyproofness are equivalent
requirements on stable mechanisms in prioritybased resource allocation problems with
multi-unit demand.Both authors acknowledge financial support
from MEC under project ECO2014 57442 P and from Fondecyt under project No. 1151230. Romero-Medina acknowledges the financial support from the Ministerio Economía y Competitividad (Spain),
grants, MECD PR15/00306 and MDM 2014-0431. Triossi acknowledges the financial support from the
Institute for Research in Market Imperfections and Public Policy, ICM IS130002, Ministerio de Economía, Fomento y Turismo
Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets
No full textWe study a class of sequential non-revelation mechanisms through which hospitals make simultaneous
take-it-or-leave-it offers to doctors. The inclusion of contracts shrinks the set of equilibrium outcomes
and harms doctors more than hospitals, but it maintains the stability of the set of equilibrium outcomes.
Our analysis reveals the existence of a first-mover advantage that is absent from the model without
contracts. The mechanisms of this class are outcome equivalent and implement the set of stable
allocations in subgame perfect equilibrium when enough competitive pressure is present. Equilibrium
outcomes form a lattice when preferences are substitutable.Both authors acknowledge financial support received from Ministerio Economía y Competitividad (Spain) under project
ECO2014_57442_P and from Fondecyt under project No. 1151230. Romero-Medina acknowledges financial support received
from Ministerio Economía y Competitividad (Spain) PR15/00306 and MDM 2014-0431, and Comunidad de Madrid, MadEco-CM
(S2015/HUM-3444), and Triossi acknowledges financial support received from the Institute for Research in Market Imperfections
and Public Policy, ICM IS130002, Ministerio de Economía, Fomento y Turismo [Chile]. We thank Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, José Alcalde,
Luis Corchón, Umut Dur, Lars Ehlers, Hideo Konishi, Thayer Morrill, Alejandro Neme, Jorge Oviedo, Tayfun Sönmez, Bertan
Turhan, Utkun Ünver, and Yosuke Yasuda for their helpful comments. Triossi acknowledges the hospitality of Collegio Carlo
Alberto, and Romero-Medina acknowledges the hospitality of Boston College afforded while writing this paper
El Tlacuache Núm. 488 (2011). 488 Año 11 (2011) octubre. El Tlacuache
No full textChalcatzingo¿Pueblo Mágico? por Carlos Barreto Mark. -Trabajos recientes en el Exconvento de San Agustín en Jonacatepec por José Cuauhtli A. Medina Romero
Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets
No full textWe study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many to-many matching markets. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the worker-optimal stable mechanism is a stable and group strategy-proof rule for firms and workers. Furthermore, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-to-many matching markets.Both authors acknowledge financial support from Ministerio Economía y Competitividad
(Spain) under project ECO2014 57442 P and from Fondecyt under project No. 1151230. Romero-Medina acknowledges the financial support from
Ministerio Economía y Competitividad (Spain) MDM 2014-0431, and Comunidad
de Madrid, MadEco-CM (S2015/HUM-3444) and Triossi acknowledges
the financial support from the Institute for Research in Market Imperfections
and Public Policy, ICM IS130002, Ministerio de Economía, Fomento y Turismo.
Triossi acknowledges the hospitality of Collegio Carlo Alberto while writing this
paper
El Tlacuache Núm. 519 (2012). 519 Año 13 (2012) mayo. El Tlacuache
No full textDel Proyecto “Ciudades Sagradas del México Antiguo” en Xochicalco por José Cuauhtli A. Medina Romero. -Otra vez tierra adentro, mar afuera por Antonio García de León por Una pequeña muestra de la gran diversidad de especies en Xochicalco por José Cuauhtli A. Medina Romero
El Tlacuache Núm. 920 (2020). 920 Año 19 (2020) febrero. El Tlacuache
No full textEL turismo como aliado para el desarrollo por José Cuahtli A. Medina Romero y Miriam Guzmán Martíne
El Tlacuache Núm. 487 (2011). 487 Año 11 (2011) octubre. El Tlacuache
No full textÉtica crítica y práctica política académica de los científicos sociales morelenses, un momento de subsunción coherente desde la Filosofía de la Liberación de Enrique Dussel. -El Proyecto “Sur de Morelos: Chimalacatlán” durante la temporada 2007 por José Cuauhtli A. Medina Romero. -Medidas de seguridad para visitantes a Zonas Arqueológicas en época de lluvias
Boosting scientific research : evidence from a public program
No full textWe analyze the design of a unique Spanish public program aimed at recruiting high quality researchers in public research centers: the Ramón y Cajal Program. We claim that, after a number of calls, the program design changed in response to agents' needs. Exploiting data on applications and candidates we find that the new program design led to significant changes in the probability of being awarded with a contract. In particular, opportunities for candidates without attachment to the system were equalized.We thank the Subdirección General de Formación y Movilidad del Personal Investigador (Spanish Office of Training and Mobility of
Researchers) for providing the raw data, and Miguel Benavente for help in data handling. Research funding from Ministry of Education,
Grant Nos. ECO2009-11165 (Alonso-Borrego), ECO2011-25330 (Romero-Medina and Triossi) and ECO2009-10287 (Sánchez-Mangas) is
acknowledged
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