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Residual Stresses in 3013 Containers
No full textThe DOE Complex is packaging plutonium-bearing materials for storage and eventual disposition or disposal. The materials are handled according to the DOE-STD-3013 which outlines general requirements for stabilization, packaging and long-term storage. The storage vessels for the plutonium-bearing materials are termed 3013 containers. Stress corrosion cracking has been identified as a potential container degradation mode and this work determined that the residual stresses in the containers are sufficient to support such cracking. Sections of the 3013 outer, inner, and convenience containers, in both the as-fabricated condition and the closure welded condition, were evaluated per ASTM standard G-36. The standard requires exposure to a boiling magnesium chloride solution, which is an aggressive testing solution. Tests in a less aggressive 40% calcium chloride solution were also conducted. These tests were used to reveal the relative stress corrosion cracking susceptibility of the as fabricated 3013 containers. Significant cracking was observed in all containers in areas near welds and transitions in the container diameter. Stress corrosion cracks developed in both the lid and the body of gas tungsten arc welded and laser closure welded containers. The development of stress corrosion cracks in the as-fabricated and in the closure welded container samples demonstrates that the residual stresses in the 3013 containers are sufficient to support stress corrosion cracking if the environmental conditions inside the containers do not preclude the cracking process
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Baseline Microstructural Characterization of Outer 3013 Containers
Full text linkThree DOE Standard 3013 outer storage containers were examined to characterize the microstructure of the type 316L stainless steel material of construction. Two of the containers were closure-welded yielding production-quality outer 3013 containers; the third examined container was not closed. Optical metallography and Knoop microhardness measurements were performed to establish a baseline characterization that will support future destructive examinations of 3013 outer containers in the storage inventory. Metallography revealed the microstructural features typical of this austenitic stainless steel as it is formed and welded. The grains were equiaxed with evident annealing twins. Flow lines were prominent in the forming directions of the cylindrical body and flat lids and bottom caps. No adverse indications were seen. Microhardness values, although widely varying, were consistent with annealed austenitic stainless steel. The data gathered as part of this characterization will be used as a baseline for the destructive examination of 3013 containers removed from the storage inventory
Santa Fe (ATSF) 3013
No full textA photograph postcard showing Santa Fe 3013, 2-10-2, running light down Cajon Pass near Verdemont, CA. [was class 3000: see 2008-008-1753
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Closure Weld Development for 3013 Outer Containers
Full text linkExcess plutonium materials in the DOE complex are packaged and stored in accordance with DOE-STD-3013. This standard specifies requirements for the stabilization of such materials and subsequent packaging in dual nested seal-welded containers. Austenitic stainless steels have been selected for container fabrication. The inner 3013 container provides contamination control while the outer 3013 container is the primary containment vessel and is the focus of this paper. Each packaging site chose a process for seal welding the outer 3013 containers in accordance with its needs and expertise. The two processes chosen for weld closure were laser beam welding (LBW) and gas tungsten arc welding (GTAW). Following development efforts, each system was qualified in accordance with DOE-STD-3013 prior to production use. The 3013 outer container closure weld joint was designed to accommodate the characteristics of a laser weld. This aspect of the joint design necessitated some innovative process and equipment considerations in the application of the GTAW process. Details of the weld requirements and the development processes are presented and several potential enhancements for the GTAW system are described
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Chloride Removal From Simulated 3013 Solids
Full text linkThis report describes Chloride Removal From Simulated 3013 Solids
3013/9975 Surveillance Program Interim Summary Report
Full text linkThe K-Area Materials Storage (KAMS) Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) requires a surveillance program to monitor the safety performance of 3013 containers and 9975 shipping packages stored in KAMS. The SRS surveillance program [Reference 1] outlines activities for field surveillance and laboratory tests that demonstrate the packages meet the functional performance requirements described in the DSA. The SRS program also supports the complexwide Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP) [Reference 2] for 3013 containers. The purpose of this report is to provide a summary of the SRS portion of the surveillance program activities through fiscal year 2010 (FY10) and formally communicate the interpretation of these results by the Surveillance Program Authority (SPA). Surveillance for the initial 3013 container random sampling of the Innocuous bin and the Pressure bin has been completed and there has been no indication of corrosion or significant pressurization. The maximum pressure observed was less than 50 psig, which is well below the design pressure of 699 psig for the 3013 container [Reference 3]. The data collected during surveillance of these bins has been evaluated by the Materials Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Working Group and no additional surveillance is necessary for these bins at least through FY13. A decision will be made whether additional surveillance of these bins is needed during future years of storage and as additional containers are generated. Based on the data collected to date, the SPA concludes that 3013 containers in these bins can continue to be safely stored in KAMS. This year, 13 destructive examinations (DE) were performed on random samples from the Pressure & Corrosion bin. To date, DE has been completed for approximately 30% of the random samples from the Pressure & Corrosion bin. In addition, DE has been performed on 6 engineering judgment (EJ) containers, for a total of 17 to date. This includes one container that exceeded the 3013 Standard moisture limit which was opened at LANL. The container pieces and an oxide sample were sent to SRNL for examination in FY11. No significant pressurization has been observed for the Pressure & Corrosion bin containers. Relatively minor corrosion has been observed on some convenience containers and the inside of two inner containers. While the limited extent of corrosion does not jeopardize the integrity of the outer 3013 containers, it does highlight the importance of continuing to perform DE and the Shelf Life program to assure that the corrosion rate is not accelerating or changing to a different corrosion mechanism (e.g., stress corrosion cracking). Statistical sampling is currently scheduled to be completed in FY17, but there is a proposed reduction of the number of DE's per year for FY11 and beyond which may delay the completion date. Since 3013 containers are stored inside 9975 containers, surveillances of 9975 containers are performed in conjunction with 3013 container surveillances. Results of 9975 container nondestructive examinations (NDEs) and DEs indicate that the containers will provide adequate protection of the 3013 containers in K-Area storage for at least 15 years [Reference 4]
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Thermal Analysis of 3013/9975 Configuration
Full text linkThe 3013 containers are designed in accordance with the DOE-STD-3013-2004 and are qualified to store plutonium (Pu) bearing materials for 50 years. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) certified Model 9975 shipping package is used to transport the 3013 containers to the K-Area Material Storage (KAMS) facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS) and to store the containers until the plutonium can be properly dispositioned. Detailed thermal analyses to support the storage in the KAMS facility are given in References 2, 3, and 4. The analyses in this paper serve to provide non-accident condition, non-bounding, specific 3013 container temperatures for use in the surveillance activities. This paper presents a methodology where critical component temperatures are estimated using numerical methods over a range of package and storage parameters. The analyses include factors such as ambient storage temperature and the content weight, density, heat generation rate, and fill height, that may impact the thermal response of the packages. Statistical methods are used to develop algebraic equations for ease of computations to cover the factor space. All computations were performed in BTU-FT-Hr-{sup o}F units
Complex-wide representation of material packaged in 3013 containers
Full text linkThe DOE sites packaging plutonium oxide materials packaged according to Department of Energy 3013 Standard (DOE-STD-3013) are responsible for ensuring that the materials are represented by one or more samples in the Materials Identification and Surveillance (MIS) program. The sites categorized most of the materials into process groups, and the remaining materials were characterized, based on the prompt gamma analysis results. The sites issued documents to identify the relationships between the materials packaged in 3013 containers and representative materials in the MIS program. These “Represented” documents were then reviewed and concurred with by the MIS Working Group. However, these documents were developed uniquely at each site and were issued before completion of sample characterization, small-scale experiments, and prompt gamma analysis, which provided more detailed information about the chemical impurities and the behavior of the material in storage. Therefore, based on the most recent data, relationships between the materials packaged in 3013 containers and representative materials in the MIS program been revised. With the prompt gamma analysis completed for Hanford, Rocky Flats, and Savannah River Site 3013 containers, MIS items have been assigned to the 3013 containers for which representation is based on the prompt gamma analysis results. With the revised relationships and the prompt gamma analysis results, a Master “Represented” table has been compiled to document the linkages between each 3013 container packaged to date and its representative MIS items. This table provides an important link between the Integrated Surveillance Program database, which contains information about each 3013 container to the MIS items database, which contains the characterization, prompt gamma data, and storage behavior data from shelf-life experiments for the representative MIS items
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Net Weight Issue LLNL DOE-STD-3013 Containers
Full text linkThe following position paper will describe DOE-STD-3013 container sets No.L000072 and No.L000076, and how they are compliant with DOE-STD-3013-2004. All masses of accountable nuclear materials are measured on LLNL certified balances maintained under an MC&A Program approved by DOE/NNSA LSO. All accountability balances are recalibrated annually and checked to be within calibration on each day that the balance is used for accountability purposes. A statistical analysis of the historical calibration checks from the last seven years indicates that the full-range Limit of Error (LoE, 95% confidence level) for the balance used to measure the mass of the contents of the above indicated 3013 containers is 0.185 g. If this error envelope, at the 95% confidence level, were to be used to generate an upper-limit to the measured weight of the containers No.L000072 and No.L000076, the error-envelope would extend beyond the 5.0 kg 3013-standard limit on the package contents by less than 0.3 g. However, this is still well within the intended safety bounds of DOE-STD-3013-2004
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