2,539 research outputs found
HQ Twelfth Army Group situation map : [Battle of the Bulge--France, Belgium, Netherlands, and Germany] /
No full textEach quadrangle sheet shows the position of the 12th Army Group and adjacent Allied Forces and of the German units for each day from D-Day (6 June 1944) thru 26 July 1945.Date of situation printed on each sheet, e.g.: Situation 2400 hrs. 6 June 1944 HQ. FUSAG -- Situation 1200 hrs. 2 January 1945 Twelfth Army Group -- Situation as of 261200 July 1945.Later sheets cover Germany only.Relief shown by spot heights.Common title does not appear on all sheets.Base-map titles differ: 12 AG outline maps 1:500,000 -- 12th Army Group outline maps 1:1,000,000 -- 12th Army Group outline map 1:1,400,000. Some sheets have no base-map title.Troop-position information overprinted on base maps at scales of 1:400,000, 1:500,000, 1:1,000,000, 1:1,400,000, and 1:1,500,000.Map projections differ: Projection-Europe (air) conical orthomorphic -- Albers conical equal-area projection.Former security classification: Secret (officially declassified 18 June 1979).Each sheet accompanied by a declassified "G-3 Report" giving detailed information on troop positions for the period 3 Mar. 1944-26 July 1945. Various pagings ; 33 x 21 cm.Surplus map stock overprinted "Void" on verso of some sheets
Military improvisations during the Russian campaign.
No full textThis pamphlet was prepared for the Historical Division, European Command, by a group of former German generals and general staff officers. The names of the contributors are not announced at this time. The principal author, who by the end of the war had attained the rank of full general served on the Eastern Front throughout the Russian campaign and the subsequent retreat into the northern plains of Germany. He was successively commander of an infantry brigade, of a panzer division from November 1941 to February 1943, and of two different corps in the battles for Kharkov and Belgorod during 1943. Appointed commander of a panzer army on 1 December 1943, he participated in the withdrawal in the south until the Germans reached the Carpathians. In August 1944 he was transferred to Army Group Center, and his last assignment was with Army Group Weichsel. During this final phase of his military career he played an important part in the retreat from Lithuania, East Prussia, and Pomerania. The reader is reminded that all publications in the GERMAN REPORT SERIES were written by Germans from the German point of view and that the procedures of the German Army differed considerably from those of the United States Army. Authorized German tables of organization and equipment, official German combat doctrine, or standard German staff methods form the basis for improvisations throughout this pamphlet. As prepared by the authors, this study consisted of a collection of 157 examples of improvisations which were screened by the editors for pertinence, clarity, and interest to the American reader. More-over, an attempt was made to establish common denominators for the great variety of examples. Although the manuscript was completely reorganized during this editorial process, every effort was made to retain the point of view, the expressions, and even the prejudices of the authors
Fort Ord Yearbook: Company C, 11th Battle Group, 3rd Brigade, 21 April 1958 - 14 June 1958
Get PDFFort Ord California U.S. Army Training Center Infantry Company C, 11th Battle Group, 3rd Brigade, 21 April 1958 - 14 June 1958https://digitalcommons.csumb.edu/fortord_yearbooks/1007/thumbnail.jp
Fort Ord Yearbook: Company B, 10th Battle Group, 3rd Brigade, 26 January 1959 - 21 March 1959
Get PDFFort Ord California U.S. Army Training Center Infantry Company B, 10th Battle Group, 3rd Brigade, 26 January 1959 - 21 March 1959https://digitalcommons.csumb.edu/fortord_yearbooks/1012/thumbnail.jp
Fort Ord Yearbook: Company A, 3rd Battle Group, 1st Brigade, 21 March 1960 - 14 May 1960
Get PDFFort Ord California U.S. Army Training Center Infantry Company A, 3rd Battle Group, 1st Brigade, 21 March 1960 - 14 May 1960https://digitalcommons.csumb.edu/fortord_yearbooks/1017/thumbnail.jp
21 Army Group training letter #2.
No full textContents: weapon training; Royal Armoured Corps; tank gunnery; crew commanders courses; training of drivers in maneuvering into and out of landing craft; aircraft recognition; smoke; artillery cooperation with units of Royal Armoured Corps; anti-tank artillery; minefields in exercises; field documentation; bomb lines; street fighting; PIAT anti-tank ammunition; security of documents; message writing; future issues of 21 Army Group training letter; smoke in the attack; street fighting in Russia; and extracts from an order issued by General Headquarters Middle East
The Validity of British Army counterinsurgency doctrine after the war in Iraq 2003-2009
Get PDFThis thesis analyses whether the British Army’s doctrinal approach for countering insurgency is still valid in the light of the war in Iraq. Why is this important? Insurgency remains a prevalent form of instability. In the absence of a major conventional threat to British security, it is one which is likely to confront the Army for the foreseeable future. If British doctrine for counterinsurgency has been invalidated by the campaign in Iraq, this will have profound implications for the way the Army approaches, and is organized, equipped and trained for counterinsurgency in the future. If the doctrine is found to be valid, another explanation has to be found to account for the conduct and outcome of British operations in Southern Iraq between 2003 and 2009.
Using historiographical techniques, the thesis examines the principal influences on extant British doctrine, developed in 1995. It analyzes the principal British manuals, the influence on doctrine of the campaigns in Malaya and Northern Ireland and the theories of Sir Robert Thompson and Gen. Sir Frank Kitson in order to distil a ‘British Approach,’ against which both doctrine and the campaign in Iraq are judged. It examines the course of operations in Southern Iraq to determine the validity of Counter Insurgency Operations, and uses the U.S. Army’s experience in developing and applying new doctrine in Iraq in 2007 and 2008 as a comparator. The thesis concludes that there was a dichotomy between theory and practice: British doctrine provided a valid theory for counterinsurgency, yet British commanders followed it only in part to achieve, at best, mixed results. Conversely, U.S. commanders applied their new doctrine, based on British theory, to great effect. While British doctrine may be valid, the issue was the extent to which it had been assimilated
Notes on the operations of 21 Army Group, 6 June 1944-5 May 1945.
No full textHistorical narrative detailing the actions of the British Army Group. Subjects included: operation plan, after action casualties, final summary, participation in Operation Cobra, Falaise Pocket, and points of interest
Organization and command of US forces.
No full textThe organization and command of US forces will proceed as follows: initial stage (21 Army Group/First Army/S.O.S.); transition stage (21 Army Group/Third Army/Communication Zone); and final stage (SHAEF/Communication Zone)
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