378 research outputs found
A study to identify job skills required for a US Army Reserve Retention and Transition Area Manager
Full text linkPlan BThe purpose of this research study is to identify the job skills required for a United States Army Reserve (USAR) Retention and Transition Retention Area Manager to possess, in order to successfully perform his or her job. A Task Selection and Analysis Board (TSB) will conduct job analysis by reviewing the total task inventory and performance data.. The purpose of the board will be to recommend which task and skills to be included in developing and comprehensive training program of instruction (POI) to train Area Managers. The board will consist of subject matter experts drawn from the USAR Retention and Transition field. Currently, the USAR Retention and Transition Retention Area Manager’s have no formal schooling they are required to attend after completion of initial Retention and Transition Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) training in this field. That training consists of the Retention and Transition NCO (RTNCO) course taught at the Army Reserve Readiness Training Center (ARRTC), Ft. McCoy, Wisconsin. This is a three-week course that instructs newly assigned Retention and Transition NCOs on the initial job skills required to be successful as a USAR Retention and Transition NCO, (Retention and Transition NCO Program Of Instruction, 2000). The soldiers are awarded the Military Occupational Skill (MOS) designator 79V upon successful completion of this course. There is currently no follow-up training, advanced or refresher for Retention and Transition NCOs. The only other retention training offered is the Retention and Transition Manager’s Course (RTMC), which is also taught at the ARRTC. This is a two-week course designed for the senior level officer and senior level NCO at each major or separate USAR unit command, (Retention and Transition Manager Course Program of Instruction, 1999). It certainly deals with some of the same subjects that any Retention Area Manager’s training must include, but does not address all the aspects that the Retention Area Manager must be able to accomplish to be successful. The Department of the Army (DA) developed recent regulatory changes, and along with command guidance created the new Retention Area Manager’s position. The position is designed for a senior NCO who will be responsible for the actions, job performance and training of USAR Retention and Transition NCOs assigned to his or her area of operations, (Army Reserve Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Handbook for Retention and Transition, 2001). It is critical that the job skills and tasks be identified for the position. This will enable quality training for the individuals to occur and prepare them as they step into a position as Retention Area Manager that is critical to the U.S. Army Reserves retention and transition efforts. The Task Selection Board will address the following areas: 1) task analysis and selection; 2) training references; 3) training delivery modes; 4) training sequence; 5) training target audience; 6) course description; and 7) training length. The TSB will be established and operated in accordance with regulatory guidance contained in two references the (Army Reserve Readiness Training Center Regulation 351-1-1, Systems Approach to Training, 1999), and the (Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Regulation 350- 70, Systems Approach to Training Management, Processes, and Products, 1999). It will eventually be staffed through ARRTC and the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve, Retention and Transition Division, (OCAR-RTD) prior to full implementation. This paper forms the foundation for the first portion of the Analysis Phase of the Systems Approach to Training (SAT), (Army Reserve Readiness Training Center Regulation 351-1-1, Systems Approach to Training, 1999). It will deal strictly with the results from Task Selection Board and analysis derived from that board. It will not address nor follow the course development through the remaining phases of SAT process, the pilot process nor the eventual full implementation of the course
The Validity of British Army counterinsurgency doctrine after the war in Iraq 2003-2009
Full text linkThis thesis analyses whether the British Army’s doctrinal approach for countering insurgency is still valid in the light of the war in Iraq. Why is this important? Insurgency remains a prevalent form of instability. In the absence of a major conventional threat to British security, it is one which is likely to confront the Army for the foreseeable future. If British doctrine for counterinsurgency has been invalidated by the campaign in Iraq, this will have profound implications for the way the Army approaches, and is organized, equipped and trained for counterinsurgency in the future. If the doctrine is found to be valid, another explanation has to be found to account for the conduct and outcome of British operations in Southern Iraq between 2003 and 2009.
Using historiographical techniques, the thesis examines the principal influences on extant British doctrine, developed in 1995. It analyzes the principal British manuals, the influence on doctrine of the campaigns in Malaya and Northern Ireland and the theories of Sir Robert Thompson and Gen. Sir Frank Kitson in order to distil a ‘British Approach,’ against which both doctrine and the campaign in Iraq are judged. It examines the course of operations in Southern Iraq to determine the validity of Counter Insurgency Operations, and uses the U.S. Army’s experience in developing and applying new doctrine in Iraq in 2007 and 2008 as a comparator. The thesis concludes that there was a dichotomy between theory and practice: British doctrine provided a valid theory for counterinsurgency, yet British commanders followed it only in part to achieve, at best, mixed results. Conversely, U.S. commanders applied their new doctrine, based on British theory, to great effect. While British doctrine may be valid, the issue was the extent to which it had been assimilated
TRADOC PAM 525-5 1981 (OBSOLETE) : US Army operations concepts, the AirLand Battle and Corps 86.
No full textThis is one of a series of TRADOC Pamphlets used to disseminate operational concepts. Operational concepts describe how combat, combat support, and combat service support operations are to be conducted. They set forth functions and tasks to be accomplished by the various levels of command during combat. They are to be used by Army training, organization, doctrine, and materiel developers to develop their various programs. They may also be used by the operating forces of the Army in the conduct of training and other preparations for combat operations, pending incorporation of the concept into doctrinal and training literature. This pamphlet sets forth two operational concepts. The first, the AirLand Battle, is the umbrella concept describing the perceived battlefield of the 1980's. The Army 86 Studies were developed from the notions embodied in this umbrella concept, as were the Army 86 Concepts describing how combat, combat support, and combat service support operations are to be conducted. The second concept, Corps Operations 1986, is a derivative of the umbrella concept and sets forth the operational concept for corps operations on the AirLand Battlefield. It identifies missions and articulates the operational concepts by which the corps will accomplish these missions. The focus of the two concepts is to realize the full potential of the U.S. forces. Together, they form the basis for fielding, improving, and modifying the Army 86 generation of organizations, systems, and equipment through the remainder of the 1980's and into the 1990's
Camouflage; training manual for the Air Sevice Command.
No full text"Prepared by the Engineer Section, Headquarters Air Service Command, Patterson Field."Cover title.Mode of access: Internet
N11609.
No full textLetter by Major Benjamin Chidlaw: The securing and supply of a beachhead is one of the most difficult feats of warfare. The invasion of Southern France not only presented the usual problems connected with a landing operation but, in addition, presented the problem of supporting a rapidly advancing front within a relatively short time after the landings had been accomplished. The story of how the XII Air Force Service Command within Southern France alone transported, supplied, and maintained the Twelfth Air Force indicates that with proper planning and coordination an Air Force is capable of maintaining and supplying itself in a rapidly changing situation
FM 8-10 1959 (OBSOLETE) : Medical service theater of operations.
No full textMissions, responsibilities, doctrine, staff relations, and the organization and operations of the medical service at the several command levels, in varying tactical situation, and in special operations
Refining the headquarters: an analysis of army operational and tactical level command and control
Full text linkThe importance of the headquarters has increased due to the complexity of modern-day warfighting. This increased importance has led to significant growth at the operational and tactical levels. The increase has been driven in part by a surge in the complexity and volume of information within a battlespace. The resulting growth creates headquarters that are far too large to function without hindering command and control. This study aims to show that headquarters size has grown extensively and has strained command and control at the tactical and operational level, thereby reducing the commanders’ decision-making cycle, and the dissemination of information to subordinates.
To analyse this issue, extensive research was conducted looking mainly at the British involvement in the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq invasion. These conflicts were selected as they were the last two near-peer conflicts faced by Western forces. Research interviews were also conducted with senior British Army officers in order to gain first-hand accounts of modern command and control issues. The research has shown that, to fix these command and control issues, a headquarters must look to reduce staff, streamline processes, and gather information in a timelier manner to gain advantage in decision-making
Army medical service staffing in the Costar Corps.
No full textSeeks to determine if the Army Medical Service staffing of TOE 52-1T Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Corps or Airborne Corps, is adequate
The development of the British army during the wars with France, 1793-1815
Full text linkThe British Army that fought the engagement at Waterloo in 1815, was outwardly little changed from that which was engaged in the initial campaigns of the Wars, twenty-two years previously. Line upon line of red-coated, musket-armed infantry, manoeuvred as chess pieces across open fields, deciding the issue by volley and bayonet, having spent a hungry night exposed to rain and cold. The cavalry were still beautifully and often impractically clad, and were always seeking the decisive charge, on their unfed and often sickly mounts. The Army's commander still viewed his troops as 'the scum of the earth', who were rarely paid, and predominantly enlisted for life. It would therefore appear that little had altered from 1793 to 1815, and that this will be a study of continuity rather than change. However, this thesis will show that despite outward appearances, the Army that took the field at Waterloo was intrinsically different from the one that entered the conflict in 1793, being modernised in line with other institutions of state, and other European armies. This thesis is first and foremost intended to be a contribution to the history of the British Army from the outbreak of war with Revolutionary France in 1793, to the reduction of the forces after the battle of Waterloo in 1815. It proceeds from an assumption that the understanding of not only that history, but the history of the developing British state, will be significantly advanced through a study of the operation of, and the changes which took place within, the Army during the Wars with France
Action to be taken by area Air Service Commands and their subordinate supply activities upon cessation of hostilities in Europe.
No full textThis directive is being issued at this time in order that plans may be made and personnel advised of action to be taken without further orders on V-Day. Of great concern was the possibility of communication being congested and potential delay in transmission of the directives
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